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1976 Recent Decisions
FEDERAL COURTS-SUPERVISORY POWER-COURT-ORDERED LEGISLA-
TIVE APPORTIONMENT-The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that unless there is adequate justification, a federal court-
ordered plan for reapportionment of a state legislature must avoid
use of multimember districts and achieve population equality with
only de minimis variation.
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975).
The North Dakota Constitution provided for a senate comprised
of one senator from, each of 9 senatorial districts.' The house ranged
from 60 to 140 members;2 at least one representative was required
for each county.' After each decennial census, the balance of the
house was to be apportioned by the Legislative Assembly or by a
designated committee4 if the assembly did not act. After the legisla-
ture failed to apportion following the 1960 census, the designated
committee devised a plan that was later voided for constitutional
deficiencies.' After two subsequent apportionments created by the
legislature were similiarly invalidated,' the Federal District Court
1. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 29.
2. Id. § 32.
3. Id. § 35.
4. Id. The committee included the chief justice of the supreme court, attorney general,
secretary of state and the majority and minority leaders of the house of representatives.
5. State ex rel. Lein v. Sathre, 113 N.W.2d 679 (N.D. 1962). The court determined that
population variances in the plan made it clear the apportioning committee had not used
population as the basis for division. This violated the state's constitution, which commanded
alignment of districts as equally as reasonably possible to population. Id. at 684-85.
A year earlier, the North Dakota Supreme Court had dismissed a writ to stop issuance of
the plan, stating that the committee was performing a legislative function and could not be
challenged until its work was completed. State ex rel. Aamoth v. Sathre, 110 N.W.2d 228
(N.D. 1961). Plaintiffs next sought relief in federal court under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1983, 1988 (1970), but the three-judge district court stayed the proceedings on the grounds
that the state court should be the first to rule on the validity of the apportionment plan. Lein
v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535 (D.N.D. 1962).
6. A new apportionment was devised by the legislature in 1963. Although the district court
held the plan did not meet constitutional standards, it denied injunctive relief because of the
approaching 1964 elections. Paulson v. Meier, 232 F. Supp. 183, 188 (D.N.D. 1964). The 1965
Legislative Assembly would have a de facto status and should devise a new apportionment.
Id. at 190. This result was prompted by the decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), which established general guidelines for the apportion-
ment of state legislatures. See text at notes 20-21, 38-41 infra. A new apportionment in 1965
was declared unconstitutional in Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.N.D. 1965), quoting
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568, 577, 578 (1964). The court held the basis for apportion-
ment of both houses should be population, but mathematical exactness was not required and
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for North Dakota issued its own apportionment plan.' The court's
plan, which included multimember districts' and some population
variances, was challenged and upheld in the state supreme court.'
By this time, however, the 1970 census had been taken and the
district court was petitioned to devise a new plan to compensate for
shifts in population. Because the 1972 election was approaching,
an interim plan was implemented."
After the election and a rejection by referendum vote 2 of another
legislative apportionment, 3 the district court permanently adopted
some variances would be permissible if based on valid state considerations. 246 F. Supp. at
39. The plan before the court, however, was not a "good faith" attempt which satisfied
constitutional requirements. Id. at 43. The voting strength of four persons in one area was
less than that of three persons in another; a region one-eighth the size of another had greater
voting strength. Id. at 39-41.
7. Previously, the court assumed the legislature would implement a valid plan. Since the
Legislative Assembly had a "reasonable and adequate opportunity" and did not properly
reapportion, the task fell upon the court. 246 F. Supp. at 43-44. The court was aware that its
plan was "not perfect" since it included five multimember districts and violated county lines
in 12 instances, but neither was it arbitrary or discriminatory. The court emphasized that
county lines could not always be followed if the one-man, one-vote standard was used and
that problems caused by multimember districts could be solved by remedial legislation. Id.
8. Multimember districts are those in which more than one legislator is elected at large.
9. State ex rel. Stockman v. Anderson, 184 N.W.2d 53 (N.D. 1971). The plan was chal-
lenged on the grounds it violated N.D. CONsT. art. II, § 29, which prohibited more than one
senator per senatorial district. The court held the first sentence of § 29 violated the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution, since the restriction did not allow for
future population changes as required by Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) and subsequent
cases. 184 N.W.2d at 57-58.
10. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363 (D.N.D. 1972). Shifts in population since 1960
had produced population variances of 96 percent. Population variance is the deviation from
average population per representative in the most overrepresented area combined with the
deviation from average population per representative in the most underrepresented voting
districts. The range indicated by the 1970 census was from 67 percent above the average to
29 percent below the average. Id. at 365.
11. Id. The plan was stipulated as interim because it included five multimember districts
created by the court in Paulson v. Meier, 246 F. Supp. 36 (D.N.D. 1965). In light of Connor
v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), and Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549 (1972), where the
Supreme Court had ruled against multimember districts created by district courts, the
Chapman court felt "it would be improper" to permanently adopt the court-fashioned plan.
The court permitted the plan to remain in effect through the 1972 elections, however, so as
not to disrupt the elective processes. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 363, 366 (D.N.D. 1972).
12. N.D. CONST. art. II, § 25 grants the state's citizens power to propose laws by an
initiative petition and reject laws passed by the legislature with a referendum petition. When
the voters nullified the apportionment which included multimember districts, they also voted
down an initiative petition for a constitutional amendment that would have allowed exclu-
sively single-member districts. Chapmen v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 12 (1975).
13. The legislature had passed the plan over the veto of the governor, whose chief objec-
tion was the inclusion of multimember districts. 420 U.S. at 12.
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the 1972 plan.'4 This plan, which was brought before the United
States Supreme Court in Chapman v. Meier,'5 provided that 18 of
51 senators would be elected from five multimember districts'" and
included some substantial population variances.'7 The Supreme
Court voided the plan'8 on the basis that a court-ordered apportion-
ment plan of a state legislature must avoid multimember districts
and establish population equality with little more than de minimis
variation except where greater deviation is rationally required by
significant state considerations. 9
The relevant precedent concerning multimember districts began
with Reynolds v. Sims, 0 which stated in dictum that the particular
14. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371 (D.N.D. 1974). The court emphasized the plan
observed natural barriers, provided districts connected by good roads, honored county lines
and cured the earlier population defects. Id. at 374-75.
15. 420 U.S. 1 (1975). Jurisdiction was assumed under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which
allows direct appeal on an action that must be heard by a three-judge district court. A mild
jurisdictional problem was presented since the guidelines for determining the types of cases
a three-judge panel must hear refer only to constitutional challenges to state statutes. Id. §
2281. The Supreme Court, however, decided the constitutionality of a state apportionment
was among the issues to be determined by a three-judge district court. 420 U.S. at 13-14. See
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 760 (1973) (the claim that an apportionment case need not
be heard by a three-judge district court is "frivolous").
16. The district court apparently realized judicially-created multimember districts were
troublesome, and attempted to justify its plan. It felt Supreme Court decisions did not compel
exclusively single-member districts, especially where multimember districts would not result
in the underrepresentation of minorities or unresponsive legislators. The issue of multimem-
ber districts was considered a clear political issue to be resolved by the voters and the
legislature. Chapman v. Meier, 372 F. Supp. 371, 377 (D.N.D. 1974).
The majority was rigorously criticized in a dissent by Judge Bright, who felt multimember
districts were outside the court's permissible discretion after Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690
(1971). 372 F. Supp. at 388 (Bright, J., dissenting). No valid state policy supported the
creation of the districts; North Dakota had never used multimember districts before they
were introduced by a federal court, and since then they had been the source of continuing
controversy. Judge Bright foresaw no great difficulty in implementing single-member dis-
tricts. Id. at 391-92.
17. The variations ranged from 8.71 percent below the average to 11.43 percent above the
average. 372 F. Supp. at 375. Noting variances of 16, 10, and 8 percent had been held
constitutional, the court said its plan was valid since even larger deviations could be tolerated
when areas were more sparsely settled and no minorities were adversely affected. Id. at 379.
Judge Bright doubted the variances met constitutional standards, particularly since they
were not justified by any rational state policy. Id. at 393-95 (Bright, J., dissenting).
18. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). Mr. Justice Blackmum delivered the unani-
mous opinion of the Court.
19. Id. at 26-27. For an example of a policy justifying a population variance see Mahan
v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973) (deviation of 16.4 percent was necessary to avoid splitting
political subdivisions).
20. 377 U.S. 533, 579 (1964).
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needs of a state might call for multimember districts. Although
there were no multimember districts in the plan before the Reynolds
Court, they were suggested as a means by which a state could ad-
here to population standards while maintaining diversity between
houses of the legislature. Reynolds cautioned, however, that multi-
member districts posed certain problems." Multimember districts
were allowed in Fortson v. Dorsey," which held that equal protec-
tion did not require exclusive use of single-member districts. A
three-judge district court had held that an apportionment including
single and multimember districts automatically resulted in invidi-
ous discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, but its holding
was limited to a declaration that multimember districts were not
"per se bad. '23 The Court suggested in dictum that multimember
districts might be impermissible if "designedly or otherwise" they
functioned to "minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial
or political elements of the voting population." 4
Connor v. Johnson25 was the first case in which the Supreme
Court considered a court-created plan with multimember districts.
In the lower court, multimember districts had been described as
"not ideal" but their use had been permitted in view of the ap-
21. The Court referred to Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964),
decided the same day, which discussed problems in multimember districts. Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 579 n.58 (1964). Lucas noted that multimember districts were not "constitution-
ally defective" but that such districts might be undesirable for an area. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth
Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 731 n.21 (1964). The practical problems with multimember
districts included increased difficulty in making an intelligent choice among numerous candi-
dates on long ballots, the lack of identifiable constituencies within districts and the fact that
residents did not have a delegate specifically responsible to them. Id. at 731. Chapman
pointed out that criticism of multimember districts had been "frequent and widespread," 420
U.S. at 15-16, and offered that possible advantages of single-member districts included avoid-
ing confusion engendered by a large slate of candidates, preventing dominance of an entire
slate by a slim majority, reducing campaign costs and avoiding bloc voting. Id. at 20.
22. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
23. Id. at 438.
24. Id. at 439. Although multimember districts were upheld in Fortson, this dictum subse-
quently provided a standard by which other apportionments were found unconstitutional. See
Carpeneti, Legislative Apportionment: Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120
U. PA. L. REV. 666, 674 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Carpeneti].
The Court applied the Fortson test in Bums v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966) and approved
a plan utilizing multimember districts. The Burns Court noted the situation in which such
districts might be invalid: when "districts are large in relation to the total number of legisla-
tors"; when legislators are not residents over the whole district; and when multimember
districts are used in both houses of a state legislature. Id. at 88.
25. 402 U.S. 690 (1971).
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proaching filing deadline for the 1971 election. The Supreme Court
felt the matter too important to delay action and postponed the
filing deadline 10 days so single-member districts could be created.2"
This disruption of the state electoral process illustrated the Court's
strong preference for single-member districts in court-created plans,
but the Court implied there would be occasions in which a district
court could properly utilize multimember districts. 7 It was not clear
whether the Court's reluctance to approve multimember districts"
extended to state-initiated plans; however, this question was appar-
ently answered in the negative four days later when a legislative
apportionment with multimember districts was upheld in
Whitcomb v. Chavis.9 In Whitcomb, a district court had voided the
state's apportionment for cancelling the voting strength of a poor
racial minority in one county by the use of multimember districts.
Without mentioning Connor, the Supreme Court held a legislative
apportionment with multimember districts was not constitutionally
defective unless there was proof of an adverse impact upon a group's
voting power. 0 Proof was lacking in the case presented to the dis-
trict court.
It was possible that contrary results were reached in Connor and
Whitcomb because the Court was applying different standards to
26. Id. at 692-93.
27. The implication arose from the Court's qualified statement that single-member dis-
tricts were preferable "as a general matter." Id. at 692. See 50 N.C.L. REV. 104, 115 (1971).
28. It was possible the Court was beginning to agree with commentators who had criti-
cized the use of multimember districts. See Banzhaf, Multi-Member Electoral Districts-Do
They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75 YALE L.J. 1309 (1966); Carpeneti, supra
note 24, at 691-99; Dixon & Hatheway, The Seminal Issue in State Constitutional Revision:
Reapportionment Method and Standards, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV. 888, 903 (1969); 50 N.C.L.
REV. 104 (1971); 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 178 (1971).
29. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
30. The Court discussed the long debate over multimember districts and their inherent
difficulties, but declared these problems were not constitutionally controlling. Id. at 158-60.
The Court found no proof of discrimination against racial or political groups nor any evidence
that voters from multimember districts in general were overrepresented, even with bloc
voting. Id. at 146-47. The district court had abused its discretion because its conclusion had
no factual support and it had failed to explore more limited alternatives.
Whitcomb established an especially rigorous standard for challenges to multimember dis-
tricts, even though the case presented a racial claim based on equal protection grounds.
Although suits of this nature are usually favored, the plaintiffs were given a'burden of proof
that was almost impossible to meet: they had to show that the multimember districts "uncon-
stitutionally operate to dilute or cancel the voting strength of racial or political elements."
Indeed, the Court noted the burden of proof had never been met. Id. at 144. But see White
v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (burden was met).
1976
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legislative and court apportionments, but the distinction was not
explicitly articulated.' The Court did not address the discrepancy
between Connor and Whitcomb" until Chapman, when it stated
that multimember districts would be viewed differently if the plan
were court-created." The legislature was entrusted with formulating
state policy as expressed in apportionment plans; federal courts
were not. 4 Since the use of multimember districts must be justified
by rational state policy, state legislatures are the only appropriate
bodies that can implement such districts unless they have been used
as a matter of state policy in previous legislative apportionments or
31. It was also suggested that although Mississippi implemented multimember districts
in 1964, districts there had previously long been subdivided and the court's imposition of at-
large districts in Connor did not really further established state policy. The Supreme Court.
1970 Term, 85 H~Av. L. REV. 3, 146 (1971). Since Whitcomb involved a northern state, there
was also speculation that a different standard had been established based on the location of
the apportioned state. The rationale was that in the North there was less chance multimem-
ber districts would be used to promote racial discrimination. 50 N.C.L. REV. 104, 113 (1971).
Another explanation was that Whitcomb merely fell under an exception to.the general rule
established by Connor. Id. at 115. See note 24 supra. On the other hand, it has been pointed
out that since the plaintiff's four suggested single-member plans were discarded in Connor
and a multimember plan adopted without explanation, the Court may have examined Connor
"with a particularly critical eye." 50 N.C.L. Rev. 104, 116 (1971). Perhaps the best distinction
is that Whitcomb was based on a minimum constitutional standard defining what is permissi-
ble, while Connor represented what is "best." The theory is that the Supreme Court's supervi-
sory power enables it to impose rules on the lower federal courts which are not constitutional
requirements. Hence, the Court determined single-member districts were desirable for policy
reasons and required their use when the district courts implemented their own plans. See 50
N.C.L. REV. 104, 115 (1971). Cf. East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 96 S. Ct. 1083
(1976) (Court expressly withheld approval of district court's constitutional views on at-large
elections and found the district court had abused its discretion in not initially ordering a
single-member reapportionment plan).
32. Between Whitcomb and Chapman, the Supreme Court upheld court-created multi-
member districts in Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973), and disallowed such districts in
a state-initiated apportionment in White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973). However, each case
was clearly limited to its facts. In Mahan, malapportionment of military personnel and the
pressing time limitations created by an approaching election made the plan acceptable. 410
U.S. at 331-33. In addition, the plan was only interim. In White, the Court found Mexicans
and Negroes had been closed out of the political processes of Texas by multimember districts.
Hence, the plan violated the standards established in Fortson and Whitcomb. White v.
Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767 (1973).
33. 420 U.S. at 18-19.
34. Cf. Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 332 (1973) (remedial interim apportionment
traditionally a function of district courts); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 97-98 (1966)
(district court may implement a remedial or permanent plan if the legislature does not);
Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 690, 693 (1964) (after legislature had had an ample opportunity
to apportion, federal court need not wait for state court to act regarding apportionment);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586 (1964) (judicial relief available if legislature does not act;
until legislature acts, an interim remedy is appropriate).
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are implemented by courts on a remedial or temporary basis .35
Hence, federal courts devising legislative apportionments are gener-
ally precluded from initiating the use of multimember districts.
Since district courts must apportion according to the supervisory
guidelines established by the Supreme Court,3 the implementation
of multimember districts in court-created plans can be proscribed
even though the use of such districts is not per se unconstitutional . '
Development of the principles applicable to population variances
likewise began with Reynolds v. Sims,35 which held that states must
do their best"9 to apportion districts "as nearly of equal population
as practical"; slight variances were permissible if necessary to im-
plement rational state policy." The Court refrained from establish-
ing any precise constitutional tests," in order to allow for considera-
tion of special circumstances in each state. In Swann v. Adams,4"
the Court invalidated a legislative apportionment with a large popu-
lation variance. Significantly, the Court demonstrated great impa-
tience with population variances. The Swann Court appeared to
read Reynolds as requiring adequate justification for even minimal
35. 420 U.S. at 18-19.
36. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1971).
37. 420 U.S. at 18. The Court reminded that it had exercised its supervisory power in
Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971), when it ruled that a district court should use single-
member districts unless this presented "'insurmountable difficulties.'" 420 U.S. at 18. As a
general rule, multimember districts are allowed in court plans only when their use promotes
a state interest. Id. at 27. In Chapman, the Court found multimember districts furthered no
state policy. Multimember senate districts had been established in North Dakota by the
district court in the apportionments of 1965, 1972 and 1974. The legislature's 1973 act imple-
mented such districts but the statute was voided by referendum. See note 12 supra. Further-
more, examination of the lower court record, 372 F. Supp. at 392, showed it would not be
extremely difficult to develop a plan utilizing only single-member districts. 420 U.S. at 21.
The district court was ordered to devise a plan using only single-member districts, provided
the Legislative Assembly did not enact a constitutionally valid apportionment in the
meantime. Id.
38. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
39. This means "an honest and good faith effort" to attain approximate population equal-
ity between districts in apportionments of legislatures. Id. at 577.
40. Id. The Court stated the standard was not as strict as the one-man, one-vote require-
ment for congressional redistricting established in Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
377 U.S. at 577-81. "Mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional
requirement." Id. at 577. See id. at 579; cf. id. at 622 (Harlan, J., dissenting). For a discussion
of the troublesome aspects of population standards see Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly,
377 U.S. 713, 742 (1964) (Clark, J., dissenting); id. at 749 (Stewart, J., dissenting); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 323 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964).
42. 385 U.S. 440 (1967).
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variances.43 Justified variances, however, were not necessarily
minimal. This was illustrated in Mahan v. Howell," which upheld
a deviation of 16.4 percent on the ground the divergence was
needed to further rational state policy.
Until Chapman, the Court had not stated that the acceptability
of population variances depended on whether they appeared in a
state-created or court-fashioned apportionment. Chapman ex-
pressed this distinction by requiring "population equality with little
more than de minimis variation"4 in court plans, while continuing
the Court's reluctance to impose this rule as a constitutional stan-
dard that would be applicable to legislative plans." The Court lim-
43. In Swann, the Court rejected an apportionment for failure to rationalize population
variances of 25.6 percent in the senate and 33.6 percent in the house. Although the variances
were large, the Court indicated minor deviations must also be justified. Id. at 444. The case
seemed to suggest that the Court was tightening the Reynolds requirement, that justifications
for population variances would be rigorously reviewed and that even adequate justification
could result in no more than minor variations. See R. DIXON, DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION IN
LAW AND PouTIcs 445 (1968). Subsequent cases demonstrated, however, that variations under
10 percent are valid even without justification. See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(7.83 percent deviation allowed without justification); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973)
(9.9 percent deviation permitted without justification).
44. 410 U.S. 315 (1973). In Mahan the Court approved the plan by concluding the state
was following a. rational policy of maintaining subdivision lines and that the variance was
within tolerable limits. Id. at 326. This was challenged in a dissent by Justice Brennan, who
said a "critical government interest" was needed to justify such variances, id. at 340 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting), and that none had been shown. Id. at 345. The Court had noted that
although the 16 percent variation "approach[ed] tolerable limits," it was substantially less
than deviations the Court had previously held invalid. Id. at 329. Justice Brennan, however,
pointed out that substantially lower variances had been ruled constitutionally impermissible
by many lower courts. Id. at 336 (Brennan, J., dissenting). After Mahan, the Court held a
7.83 percent deviation permissible in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). It claimed
Mahan did not hold that any deviation from exact population equality among state legislative
districts violated equal protection, or that it was invalid absent justification. Id. at 743.
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) allowed a deviation of 9.9 percent, reasoning the
Supreme Court had not held that "any deviations from absolute equality, however small,
must be justified" but that larger deviations require justification. Id. at 763-64. In Gaffney,
the Court warned that too stringent standards would in essence press the duty to apportion
upon federal courts. 412 U.S. at 749. Exaggerated adherence to mathematical standards
would lead to repeated apportionments just to obtain smaller deviations. Id. at 750-51. With
court-created apportionments, however, the same considerations are not present. Since courts
are already apportioning, there is no threat of apportionments being forced upon them.
Moreover, federal court plans are usually interim so the specter of repeated apportionments
would not be a problem. Therefore, there is no harm in establishing very strict standards for
these plans through the use of the supervisory power of the Supreme Court.
45. 420 U.S. at 27.
46. In neither White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) nor Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S.
735 (1973) did the Court explicitly accept a de minimis standard. Rather, the rule seemed to
be that unless invidious discrimination was proven by a plaintiff, variations of under 10
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ited the higher standard for court plans when it stated greater diver-
gencies in such plans would be acceptable if needed to further "im-
portant and significant" state policies.47 The separate standard
serves as a clear reminder that courts redistrict only because the
legislature has failed to do so," and then only to implement approxi-
mate population equality which is subject in some instances to legit-
imate state policies.
Chapman may produce a benefit in terms of assuring that when
federal courts undertake the state function of legislative apportion-
ment 9 the result will be the most equitable apportionment possible.
Court plans must meet the constitutional tests, but they must also
pass the higher standards established through the Supreme Court's
use of its supervisory power. This may, however, reduce the effec-
tiveness of court-ordered plans of reapportionment, which are often
used to provide a prompt remedy when legislatures have failed to
act. Exceptionally high standards may slow the formulation of
court-ordered plans. There is one way to reconcile the conflict. If
Chapman were limited to only permanent court-created plans, it
would reserve the courts' power to establish less than perfect plans
percent in state-created plans need not be justified. Casper, Apportionment and the Right
to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 20.
47. 420 U.S. at 27. The proposed rationale was that North Dakota's sparse population
called for larger deviations to avoid excessively large districts. It was argued that the plan
was justified because the state had no victimized minorities, and that a state policy of
maintaining geographic boundaries was being furthered. The Court disagreed, asserting that
all underrepresented citizens were affected by the plan. Moreover, the fact that North Dakota
was thinly populated meant individual votes carried more weight; this probably required a
stricter standard for apportionment. Finally, the Court found the state's own apportionment
plan had abandoned the policy of maintaining particular boundaries. Id. at 24-26. Further-
more, had the district court given reasons for its plan, the apportionment would still have
been unacceptable since the disparity level was well beyond that allowed even state plans.
The court's plan had a population variance of 20.14 percent. The largest deviation in a state-
created plan that had been allowed, even with justification, was 16.4 percent in Mahan v.
Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
48. See 420 U.S. at 19, 21, 24-27.
49. The role of federal courts in reapportionment was well summarized by the Court in
White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 794 (1973). The Court noted that reapportionment is generally
a legislative function; court-created plans should be used only if the legislature does not
apportion according to federal constitutional requirements in. a timely fashion after having
an adequate opportunity to do so. When it does apportion, a federal court should adhere to
the policies of the state, as articulated in the state's statutes and constitution or inferred from
apportionment schemes devised by the legislature, as long as the state policy does not lead
to an unconstitutional result. In general, a court must not "pre-empt the legislative task nor
'intrude upon state policy any more than necessary.'" Id.
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as a remedial measure and would inhibit courts from making state
policy in the form of permanent legislative apportionments.
David R. Johnson
CRIMINAL LAW-CONSPIRACY-WHARTON'S RULE-ORGANIZED CRIME
CONTROL ACT OF 1970-The Supreme Court of the United States has
held that separate convictions for conspiracy to commit and com-
pletion of a federal gambling offense are not subject to the presump-
tion of merger created by Wharton's Rule because Congress in-
tended to retain each offense as an independent weapon in combat-
ing organized crime.
Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
In the fall of 1970, United States Attorney General Mitchell au-
thorized wiretaps on the telephones at the Robert E. lannelli resi-
dence in suburban Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.' The evidence gath-
ered was used to indict lannelli and several others on charges of
conspiring to violate and violating § 1955 of Title 18,2 a federal
gambling statute which outlaws combinations of five or more per-
sons to conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct or own a gam-
bling business prohibited by state law. One of defendants' pretrial
motions urged dismissal of the conspiracy count brought under §
1. United States v. lannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171, 174 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970). This section of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
imposes upon violators a fine not in excess of $20,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than
five years. As used in § 1955, an "illegal gambling business"
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is con-
ducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct,
or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in
excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $20,000 in any single day.
Id.
Title 18 of the United States Code defines an illegal gambling business in § 1955 as
meaning, inter alia, one which has a gross revenue of $20,000 in any single day. This is a
misprint, as the Statutes at Large report the requirement for gross revenue in any single day
at $2,000. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 803, 84 Stat. 937. In
18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (Supp. 1976), the figure reported is $2,000. The Supreme Court listed the
requirement at $2,000 but inaccurately cited the United States Code for this purpose. lannelli
v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 772 n.2 (1975).
